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RECENT CASES
mount issue in most fourth amendment litigation. 104 The arrest warrant
plus probable cause rule as applied to the Payton situation is consistent
with the expectation of privacy test. When that test is applied to the "entry
of the third party's residence to arrest" question, however, it mandates a
search warrant requirement and the Court, in Steagald, should reach that
result.
STEVEN W. HUBBARD
CONCURRENT ESTATES IN LAND:
JOINT TENANCY BETWEEN TWO
MARRIED COUPLES, OR A MARRIED
COUPLE AND ANOTHER PERSON-
JOINT TENANCY OR TENANCY BY
THE ENTIRETY WITHIN THE
MARRIED COUPLE
Nelson v. Hotchkiss'
Grantor conveyed a farm by a 1969 deed to "[HI] and [W1], husband
and wife; and [H2] and [W2], husband and wife, all as joint tenants with
right of survivorship in all four, and not as tenants in common."2 In
January 1975, HI and W1 dissolved their marriage. The couple agreed
that their undivided one-half interest in the farm would "remain the joint
property of [H1 and W1] for a period of two (2) years." In December
1976, H1 conveyed his interest to H2 and W2 with Wl's consent. H2 died
two months later.
W1 sued for a partition in August 1977. The trial court held that the
original conveyance created a technical joint tenancy among the four. 4
104. "In these cases, which involve application of the exclusionary rule, the
issue is whether certain evidence is admissible at trial." 445 U.S. at 591-92.
1. 601 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. En Banc 1980).
2. Id. at 16.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 17.
The concept of a joint tenancy is that there is but one estate owned
jointly by several persons. A joint tenancy is created only where there are
the four unities of title, interest, time and possession. For unity of title,
the estate must be created by one instrument, deed or will. For unity of
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Hl's conveyance to H2 and W2, the trial court ruled, severed the joint
tenancy as to that undivided one-quarter. The fact that H2 and W2 held
this one-quarter interest as tenants by the entirety was not disputed. The
remaining three-quarters was found by the trial court to be held in equal
shares by Wi, W2, and H2 as joint tenants. Following H 2 's death, W1 and
W2, the only remaining joint tenants, each survived to an undivided one-
half of the jointly held three-quarters, or three-eighths each. W2, as the
surviving spouse in an estate by the entirety, gained complete ownership of
the one-quarter conveyed by H1 to H2 and W2. Consequently, the trial
court awarded W1 three-eighths of the partition sale proceeds and
awarded W2 three-eighths plus one-quarter, or a total of five-eighths of
the proceeds.
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District,
W2 asserted ownership as the surviving spouse in an estate by the entirety
of both the undivided one-half originally conveyed to W2 and H2 and the
undivided one-quarter later conveyed by Hi. W2 therefore claimed en-
titlement to three-quarters of the partition sale proceeds.5 The court of ap-
peals, in an opinion written by Judge Prewitt, agreed with W2 and revers-
ed. The language in the deed, the court of appeals concluded, was insuffi-
cient to negate the creation of a tenancy by the entirety between each hus-
band and wife. 6 The language in the deed was sufficient, however, to
create a joint tenancy between the two estates by the entirety.7
interest, the interests must be of the same quantum or duration: a con-
veyance to B for life'and to C and his heirs creates a tenancy in common
for B's life, not a joint tenancy. For unity of time, the interests must vest
at the same time: a conveyance to B for life, remainder to the heirs of C
and the heirs of D, creates a tenancy in common in the remainder as be-
tween the respective heirs, because their interests will vest at different
times, at the death of C as to his heirs, and at the death of D as to his
heirs.
Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests and Conveyances in
Missouri, 23 V.A.M.S. § 39, at 36 (1952).
5. Nelson v. Hotchkiss, No. 10996, slip op. at 2 (Mo. App., S.D. Nov. 14,
1979). See Davidson v. Eubanks, 354 Mo. 301, 189 S.W.2d 295 (1945):
[U]nder the statute [§ 442.450 RSMO (1978)] a grant to two or more per-
sons (other than executors and trustees and husband and wife) creates a
tenancy in common unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy; and
in our case, we have seen, a grant to husband and wife creates an estate
by the entirety, unless the instrument clearly expresses that a tenancy in
common (or a joint tenancy) is intended. Otherwise stated .... a hus-
band and wife, to whom an estate is granted as joint grantees, are prima
facie tenants by the entireties.
Id. at 310, 189 S.W.2d at 299-300. In Nelson, the supreme court referred to the
rule that a husband and wife take as tenants by the entirety as a rebuttable
presumption. 601 S.W.2d at 18.
6. No. 10996, slip op. at 4.
7. Id. at 5. The presumption of a tenancy in common in a conveyance to
two or more people is derived from RSMO § 442.450 (1978). See note 5 supra.
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The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals but
decided the case, after transfer, as though on original appeal.8 In an opin-
ion written by Judge Welliver, the supreme court noted that the divorce
between H1 and W1 ended the unity of person 9 necessary to support a
tenancy by the entirety and thereby ended the tenancy by the entirety in
their undivided one-half interest. Since they were no longer both seised of
an undivided one-half of the farm,10 but instead each seised of an un-
divided one-quarter, the unity of interest necessary to support a joint
tenancy was destroyed and the joint tenancy between the two estates by the
entirety was ended. After the dissolution, H1 and W1 each held their in-
terests as tenants in common with H2-W2's estate by the entirety in an un-
divided one-half. The nature of the tenancy between H1 and W1 after the
dissolution but prior to HI's conveyance was left unclear, but it was not
necessary for resolving the questions presented to decide whether, as be-
tween themselves, they held as joint tenants or as tenants in common. ' 2
The record contained no evidence as to either the path of devolution
intended by the 1969 conveyance or the circumstances leading up to that
transaction.13 The supreme court pointed out that the language of the
deed was not inconsistent with the formation of two estates by the entirety
and a joint tenancy between the estates.14 In fact, the court concluded that
this construction effected the probable intent of the parties. '
5
8. 601 S.W.2d at 16.
9. The unity of person is derived from the fiction that husband and wife
are one person and is often stated as a requirement of a tenancy by the entirety.
See, e.g., In re Estate of King, 572 S.W.2d 200, 211 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978). See
generally 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 33 (1944).
10. Each estate by the entirety consisted of an undivided one-half of the
farm and, as in all such estates, each tenant by the entirety was seised of the whole
estate and not of an undivided one-half of the estate. See generally 41 C.J.S. Hus-
band and Wife § 34 (1944).
11. See note4supra.
12. In cases decided under Missouri's old divorce law, absolute divorce con-
verted a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common unless agreed or ad-
judged otherwise. See, e.g., McIntyre v. McIntyre, 377 S.W.2d 421, 426 (Mo.
1964); Allan v. Allan, 364 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Mo. 1963); Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 355
S.W.2d 934, 939 (Mo. 1962).
The new dissolution law states that the trial judge "shall divide the marital
property." RSMO § 452.330 (1978). Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1977) interpreted this section as requiring the trial judge to divide the
marital property. Id. at 804. An earlier case, Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259
(Mo. App., K.C. 1976), found that the legislative intent of RSMO § 452.330 was
to foreclose the tenancy in common option except where the "economics
involved" required such a solution. Id. at 264. For a definition of marital prop-
erty, see note 41 infra.
13. 601 S.W.2d at 20.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 20.
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Nelson is the first Missouri case to decide whether a conveyance of real
property to "husband and wife" creates a tenancy by the entirety or a joint
tenancy. 16 Previous cases had decided that a conveyance to "husband and
wife as tenants in common" created a tenancy in common instead of a
tenancy by the entirety;' 7 that a conveyance to "husband and wife jointly"
created a tenancy by the entirety; 18 and that a tenancy by the entirety, in-
stead of a joint tenancy, had been created in a bank account opened by a
husband and wife. 19
The instant case reaffirmed the proposition that, absent language
which "clearly expresses" 20 a contrary intent in a conveyance to "husband,
wife, and a third party," the husband and wife take a one-half interest as
tenants by the entirety and the third party takes a one-half interest.21 The
question apparently had not arisen in any reported Missouri Supreme
Court case during this century, but had been faced in a recent Missouri
court of appeals case. 22
In addition, the Nelson court found that the presumption that two
tenancies by the entirety are created by a deed to two married couples can
be overcome by a clearly expressed intent to create a joint tenancy among
the four grantees. 23 As authority for this observation the court cited, but
did not discuss, Fekkes v. Hughes, a Massachusetts case. 24 In Fekkes, a
16. For a discussion concerning the technical differences between a joint
tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety, see 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 33
(1944).
17. Davidson v. Eubanks, 354 Mo. 301, 312, 189 S.W.2d 295, 300 (1945).
18. Milligan v. Bing, 341 Mo. 648, 657, 108 S.W.2d 108, 112 (1937) (it was
not argued that a joint tenancy had been created).
19. Cullum v. Rice, 236 Mo. App. 1113, 1118, 162 S.W.2d 342, 344 (K.C.
1942).
20. 601 S.W.2d at 19.
21. Id. at 18.
22. A Missouri court of appeals case decided two months before Nelson,
Jenni v. Gamel, 602 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980), ruled that a conveyance
to "husband, wife, son-i, and son-2 as joint tenants or to the survivor of them"
transferred a one-third interest to each son and a one-third interest to husband-
wife. Id. at 700-01. Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670, 677 (1877) appears to be the
most recent Missouri Supreme Court case on the subject. TheJenni court relied
on Hall to support its apportionment.
23. 601 S.W.2d at 19.
24. 354 Mass. 303, 237 N.E.2d 19 (1968). The dissent in Nelson at the court
of appeals argued that Fekkes was authority for the proposition that the con-
veyance in Nelson created a joint tenancy among the four as individuals and that
the use of the words "with right of survivorship in all four" expressed an intent
"that the joint tenancy should exist without qualification among all of the
grantees." No. 10996, slip op. at 2 (Maus, J., dissenting).
TheJenni analysis of Fekkes tracks Judge Maus' analysis because the creation
of a technical joint tenancy among "husband, wife, and third parties" hinges on
the use of the word "all." InJenni, the failure to use "all" before "as joint tenants"
442 [Vol. 46
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conveyance to "[H1] and [WI], husband and wife, and [112] and [W2],
husband and wife, all as joint tenants" 25 was found to create a technical
joint tenancy among the four. The Fekkes court added that the use of the
word "all" overcame any ambiguity as to the parties' intent. 26 In the in-
stant case, however, the same language as the Fekkes conveyance plus the
words "with right of survivorship in all four and not as tenants in common"
was found not to create a technical joint tenancy among the four. It is
unclear whether Fekkes was cited to show only that the presumption of two
tenancies by the entirety can be overcome or to serve as an example of how
Missouri courts would rule given the same facts. In other words, the Nelson
court might not find that the presumption is overcome by the language
used in the Fekkes deed.
Nelson provides Missouri attorneys with valuable guidelines for the
preparation of a deed. An attorney should always draft the deed not
simply to be defensible at trial but to preclude any possibility of
litigation.2 7 If the attorney intends to create a tenancy other than one by
the entirety in a conveyance to a husband and wife, that intent must be
"clearly expressed. '28 The present case demonstrates that a conveyance to
"husband and wife as joint tenants and not as tenants in common" would
not be a "clear expression" of an intent to create a joint tenancy. A tenancy
by the entirety is, as a practical matter, a special form of a joint tenancy.2 9
The court stated that the words "and not as tenants by the entirety" will
seems to have prevented the creation of a technical joint tenancy among the four
grantees. 602 S.W.2d at 700-01.
Nelson demonstrates, however, that the use of "all as joint tenants" in a con-
veyance to "husband, wife and a third party," without a recital that the husband
and wife are not to hold as tenants by the entirety, will not create a technical joint
tenancy among the grantees as individuals. In other words, Jenni's reliance on
Fekkes to prevent the creation of a joint tenancy among all four grantees was
misplaced.
25. 354 Mass. at 304, 237 N.E.2d at 20. At the time of this case,
Massachusetts presumed the creation of a tenancy by the entirety in a conveyance
to a husband and wife. Id.
26. Id. The Fekkes court emphasized the word "all," probably to distinguish
Fekkes from an earlier case, Fulton v. Katsowney, 342 Mass. 503, 174 N.E.2d 366
(1961). In Fulton, a conveyance to a third party and a husband and wife "as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common" created a tenancy by the entirety in the
husband and wife in an undivided one-half. Id. at 504, 174 N.E.2d at 367. The
Fulton court found an ambiguity as to whether the joint tenancy applied only as
between the husband and wife or as among all three parties. It held that the hus-
band and wife were tenants by the entirety and that only a tenancy in common
was created between the estate by the entirety and the third party. Id. at 505, 174
N.E.2d at 368.
27. Peterson & Eckhardt, Legal Forms, 6 MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES § 691
(1960).
28. See note 5 supra.
29. See note 16 supra.
1981] 443
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overcome the presumption of the creation of a tenancy by the entirety in a
conveyance to a husband and wife.30 A specific negative recital should be
included, therefore, if a tenancy by the entirety is not intended.
The controversy might never have occurred in Nelson had the deed
clearly expressed the parties' intent. W1 argued that a joint tenancy was
created among the four grantees. When given the circumstances of the in-
stant case, authorities suggest that such an intent can be implemented by
the following language: "to [HI] and [W1], his wife, and [H2] and [W2],
his wife, in undivided one-fourths, as joint tenants in fee simple absolute
and not as tenants in common, and not as tenants by the entirety between
the said [H1] and [Wi] and not as tenants by the entirety between the said
[H2] and [W2]. ' 31
W2 argued, and the supreme court agreed, that a tenancy by the en-
tirety between each husband and wife and a joint tenancy between the
couples were created by the conveyance. Authorities suggest that this in-
tent can be more clearly implemented by the following: "to [HI] and
[WI], his wife, as tenants by the entirety, an undivided one-half, and to
[H2] and [W2], his wife, as tenants by the entirety, an undivided one-half,
the two couples to hold as joint tenants and not as tenants in common."3 2
The original intent of the parties in Nelson, however, may have been
to allow the ultimate survivor to take the fee simple absolute and to
minimize any possibility that a partition, mortgage, or conveyance out
would prevent this. A series of life estates followed by a remainder in fee
could have effected this intent. Each grantee would have had a life estate
and a contingent remainder in fee in the whole. The ultimate survivor
would then have taken by way of remainder in fee rather than by way of
the incident of survivorship. 33 This intent could have been implemented
by stating: "to [HI, Wi, H2, W2] as tenants in common for their joint
lives, and then to the three survivors of them as tenants in common for
their joint lives, and then to the two survivors of them as tenants in com-
mon for their joint lives, and then to the survivor of them in fee simple ab-
solute."3 4 The contingent remainders created probably are not destructi-
ble in Missouri. 5
30. 601 S.W.2d at 20.
31. Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 27, § 724.5 (Berman Supp. 1979). This
form contains the language suggested by the court to manifest a "clear
expression" of an intent not to create a tenancy by the entirety between each hus-
band and wife. 601 S.W.2d at 20.
32. Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 27, § 725.
33. No difference in final result would seem to occur, but creating such
estates would seem to minimize the likelihood that the intent of the parties for the
ultimate survivor to take the entire fee could be defeated. A partition, mortgage,
or conveyance out would destroy the right of survivorship incident to a joint
tenancy in fee since the unities of title and time would be destroyed. See note 4
supra.
34. Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 27, § 754.
35. "At common law a contingent remainder was destructible." Eckhardt &
444 [Vol. 46
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The supreme court did not discuss Hunter v. Hunter6 in which a less
than explicit devise of land using the words "joint tenants" and "with right
of survivorship" was construed to create a life estate for the shorter life with
a contingent remainder in fee in the survivor. 3 7 The omission of the words
"in fee" or similar words to limit the tenancy prevented the devise from
creating a technical joint tenancy capable of severance by a conveyance of
a jointly held interest. s8 If this construction had been adopted by the
Nelson court, partition probably would not have been possible unless all
parties holding a present or future interest had consented. Under this
view, all grantees would have been tenants in common in a series of life
estates. It would then have been important to determine whether Hi
transferred only a life estate or all right, title, and interest in his undivided
one-quarter. If Hi transferred only a life estate, W1 might then have been
entitled to only one-third, W2 would have taken a remainder in one-third
of H2's share instead of surviving to H2's entire interest, and H1 would
have been compensated for the contingent remainder he did not convey.
The decision in Nelson leaves unclear the effect of the new Missouri
marriage-dissolution law3 9 on a technical joint tenancy between husband
and wife. Prior to the new law, all property held in a tenancy by the en-
tirety was, upon absolute divorce, converted into a tenancy in common
where the parties did not otherwise dispose of the property by separation
agreement.4 0 Under the new law, the trial judge is required to dispose of all
marital property. 41 The trial court in Nelson, which ruled each grantee an
Peterson, supra note 4, § 49, at 47. Its destructibility in Missouri has never been
expressly ruled on but authorities suggest it is not destructible. See, e.g.,
Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Missouri, 6 Mo. L.
REV. 268, 295-96 (1941); Eckhardt, Property Law in Missouri, 25 MO. L. REV.
390, 393-94 (1960). Since this form of estate involves a contingent remainder, the
practitioner should be aware of the possibility of its destructibility and should
provide a gap in seisin so that the fee interest will be an indestructible executory
interest rather than a contingent remainder. This alternative to the contingent
remainder is discussed in Eckhardt, supra, 6 Mo. L. REV. at 272.
36. 320 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1959). Hunter is discussed in Eckhardt, Property
Law in Missouri, 24 MO. L. REV. 456, 456-58 (1959); Eckhardt, supra note 35, 25
Mo. L. REV. at 390-92.
37. 320 S.W.2d at 535.
38. This proposition can be inferred from a later case, McClendon v.
Johnson, 337 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1960), which involved a transfer similar to that in
Hunter but added the words "and to their heirs and assigns." Id. at 79. The Mc-
Clendon court held a joint tenancy in fee was created. Id. at 81. Each joint ten-
ant, therefore, could convey the fee as to his interest.
39. RSMO §§ 452.300-.420 (1978).
40. See note 12 supra.
41. Id. RSMO § 452.330.3 (1978) defines marital property:
All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital prop-
1981]
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individual joint tenant, found that the joint tenancy remained intact until
the conveyance by HI to H2 and W2. 42 In other words, a dissolution would
have no effect, in the trial court's view, on property held in technical joint
tenancy by a husband and wife unless agreed or ordered otherwise. 4 This
view, however, could lead to litigation between heirs of a decedent and
decedent's ex-spouse over whether a joint tenancy continued after the
dissolution. 44 The attorney should determine whether the client wishes an
ex-spouse to take the interest on the client's death and should resolve the
problem expressly at the time of dissolution to prevent further litigation.
The supreme court never reached the question whether a dissolution
would end presumptively a joint tenancy between husband and wife since
it found no technical joint tenancy between each husband and wife.,
Since the facts did not require such a finding, the court did not discuss the
possibility that the property agreement created a joint tenancy between HI
and Wi.
The Nelson court also did not discuss each spouse's ability to bring an
action for a partition as to the joint tenancy between the couples. Had Wi
still been married at the time of the partition suit and had she and HI still
held their interest as tenants by the entirety, could she have maintained an
action to sever the joint tenancy between the couples over Hl's objection to
the severance of their interest from the joint tenancy? The question has not
arisen in Missouri. A New Jersey case cited in the opinion answered in the
affirmative. 46
Nelson has clarified and reaffirmed the law surrounding conveyances
to a husband and wife. The case presents a textbook example of the impor-
tance of a clear statement of the tenancies and interests intended to be
created by a deed. Form books, when properly utilized, can aid the practi-
tioner greatly in the preparation of a clear, concise deed. While careful
erty regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in
some form of coownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
tenancy by the entirety, and community property.
See generally Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 MO. L.
REv. 157 (1978).
42. 601 S.W.2d at 17.
43. In at least one state, this conveyance would have created a joint tenancy
capable of continuing unchanged after divorce. See Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d
103, 108 (Wyo. 1963) (transfer was to husband and wife as joint tenants and not
as tenants in common).
44. See, e.g., Mann v. Bradley, 188 Colo. 392, 535 P.2d 213 (1975) (hus-
band and wife held house as joint tenants; nothing said about the continuation of
the right of survivorship on divorce, litigation required to prevent husband from
taking house from his minor children on the death of his ex-wife).
45. 601 S.W.2d at 17.
46. Platt v. Platt, 93 N.J. Eq. 395, 116 A. 326 (1922).
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